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Is Smart Growth Fair Growth: 
Do Urban Growth Boundaries Keep Out Racial Minorities? 
 
Introduction 
 
As many American metropolitan areas are continually spreading outward, urban 
planners, elected officials, environmentalists, and sociologists are interested in the 
effects sprawl is having on our built environment, our natural environment, and 
our society.  This study poses the question:  “Is there a relationship between smart 
growth initiatives and racial housing patterns?”   More specifically, I focus on the 
effect of a widely used smart growth policy—the urban growth boundary 
(UGB)—and investigate whether or not the presence of an UGB hinders the entry 
of blacks and Hispanics into cities and affects their level of residential segregation 
in cities.   
An urban growth boundary delineates and separates the area in which 
development (e.g., construction of new housing, shopping centers, etc.) is 
encouraged or permitted and outside of which development is discouraged or 
prohibited.  As Pendall et al. (2002: 39) note, however, “little work has examined 
the interrelationship of urban containment policies and race and class issues in 
metropolitan areas.”   This study identifies trends between 1990 and 2000 and 
compares places with and without urban growth boundaries. 
The focus of this study, the urban growth boundary, is "a line around an 
urban area within which development is encouraged—often with density bonuses 
or minimum density requirements—to accommodate projected growth over a 
specified future time period, typically ten to 20 years" (Nelson 2000: 45).  Land 
outside the urban growth boundary is restricted to low density uses, such as 
agriculture, green space, and/or small amounts of low density housing.  The two 
purposes of urban growth boundaries are: (1) limiting urban sprawl by promoting 
compact and accessible development with efficient public services, and (2) 
preserving open space, agricultural, and environmentally sensitive areas.  
 
Contributions of this Study 
 
This study contributes to the understanding of the two-way relationship between 
society and land use policies.  More specifically, it looks at whether a particular 
type of smart growth initiative, the urban growth boundary, influences racial 
housing patterns.  This inquiry is important because these boundaries are a 
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relatively new land use technique and are being increasingly employed (Porter 
1997).  Harden (2006) reports a decline in the black population in two cities with 
UGBs (Portland, OR and Seattle, WA), as they are being “priced out” of certain 
neighborhoods, though it is not clear whether this is leading to increased or 
decreased residential segregation (Harden 2006).  As a result, the debate over the 
effects of urban growth boundaries on housing costs and, ultimately, on who can 
afford to live within the UGBs merits attention from urban planners and urban 
sociologists. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Smart Growth and Housing Affordability: Three Perspectives 
 
 Smart growth and reduced housing affordability.  In the debate over 
smart growth’s effect on housing affordability, the most frequently taken position 
is that smart growth decreases affordability.  The argument is that a smart growth 
policy such as the UGB reduces the supply of developable land, and this limiting 
of supply causes the price of developable land to increase, which in turn causes 
housing costs to rise.  Examples of areas where some researchers feel smart 
growth has contributed to rising housing costs include Portland, Oregon (Lorentz 
and Shaw 2000), Laguna West, California (Gordon and Richardson 1997), San 
Francisco, California (Katz and Rosen 1987), and Kentlands, Maryland (Gordon 
and Richardson 1997). 
 
 Smart growth and increased housing affordability.  A second perspective 
on the relationship between smart growth and housing affordability is that smart 
growth practices can expand the stock of affordable homes.  Bullard, Johnson, 
and Torres (2003) suggest that infill housing developed in central city 
neighborhoods can be affordable.  To clarify, infill housing development can be 
defined as “new residential development on vacant, abandoned, and underutilized 
property within built-up areas of existing communities, where infrastructure is 
already in place” (Felt 2007: 2).  Bullard, Johnson and Torres argue that such 
infill homes can be built economically because the necessary infrastructure (e.g., 
streets, sewer lines, and electric service) are already present.  Also, smart growth 
utilizes higher residential densities and smaller lot sizes so housing units are 
smaller than traditional suburban homes, which might reduce costs.  Moreover, to 
the extent that smart growth reduces households’ need to use or own automobiles 
it reduces transportation costs, and by redirecting some of the savings (less money 
spent on gasoline, car payments or insurance) housing costs can be made a more 
affordable item in the household budget.  
 
2
The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jpps/vol5/iss1/2
3 
 
 No relationship between smart growth and housing affordability.  The 
third position on whether, or how, implementing smart growth principles affects 
housing affordability is that it depends on several other situational factors.  
Nelson et al. (2002), Downs (2002), Marshall (2000), and Porter (1992) contend 
that factors such as demand for housing, location, size, and local economic 
conditions affect housing costs so strongly that it is difficult to determine whether 
a smart growth policy has a significant effect.  In addition, Pendall (1995, 2000) 
argues that only certain types of land use regulation influence the cost of housing, 
and he finds no relationship specifically between urban growth boundaries and 
housing affordability.   
 
Urban Growth Boundaries and Racial Housing Patterns 
 
Studies by Pendall (1995, 2000), Pozdena (2002), Nelson et al. (2004), and 
Nelson (2004) examine the relationship between smart growth policies such as 
UGBs and racial housing patterns.   In theory, the link between UGBs and racial 
housing patterns is economic:  if UGBs bring about substantially higher housing 
costs in a city, then a significant percentage of blacks and Latinos might be 
“priced out” of the area because their lower incomes make them less able to 
afford housing in cities with UGBs than the more affluent whites.  However, in 
his study of five forms of growth regulation, Pendall (1995) found that urban 
growth boundaries had no effect on racial composition of cities with UGBs. 
On the other hand, Pozdena (2002) contends that if the growth restriction 
policies implemented in Portland, Oregon (especially a UGB) had been carried 
out in the nation's 77 largest metropolitan areas between 1987 and 1997, many 
urban families who currently own homes could not have afforded them due to 
increased housing prices.  Pozdena’s reasoning is that in cities with restrictions on 
real estate development, the pressure of population growth on the remaining 
developable land causes housing prices to rise substantially, which lowers 
homeownership rates among racial minorities.  His calculations suggest that 
nationally over one million households, including 260,000 minority families, 
would be unable to buy a home.  Pozdena concludes that, "Restricted growth 
policies, therefore, can fairly be dubbed ‘the new segregation’, as they deter 
African-Americans and other minorities from the housing market at 
disproportionate rates" (Pozdena 2002, p. v). 
The price of housing in places with UGBs might affect the number of 
racial minority households moving into the area (or how many move away due to 
rising housing costs). However, some researchers also examine UGBs and racial 
residential segregation (i.e., differences in the groups’ spatial distribution across a 
place’s subareas).  In theory, the presence of a UGB might contribute to lower 
levels of residential segregation since it blocks or limits the development of 
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distant suburbs, which in metropolitan areas lacking UGBs have often become 
overwhelmingly white communities.  In other words, by limiting suburban 
sprawl, UGBs could make it more difficult for whites to find spatial areas in 
which they can avoid living close to racial minorities, since whites object to 
minorities when they are about a third or more of the neighbors (Bobo and 
Zubrinsky 1996).  Of course, this assumes that fair housing laws are respected or 
enforced and also that UGBs do not have the effect of raising housing costs high 
enough to permit only a small fraction of the racial minority population to be able 
to afford to live in neighborhoods within a city bounded by an UGB.   
Nelson et al. (2004) studied change in residential segregation from 1990 to 
2000 in 101 metropolitan areas with an urban growth boundary.  Segregation 
between non-Hispanic whites and African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians was 
examined.  Other characteristics Nelson et al. (2004) looked at were population 
growth, income, crime level, number of manufacturing jobs, and policies 
requiring housing for moderate- and low-income households.  They found that a 
strong containment boundary (i.e., a UGB with severe restrictions on 
development outside it) decreases the level of segregation between African 
Americans and whites, and has no effect on the segregation of the Hispanics or 
Asians.   
In a later study, Nelson (2004) linked UGBs with reduced racial 
residential segregation.  He looked at four metropolitan areas, two that are 
bounded by a UGB (Portland, OR and Sacramento, CA) and two that are 
unbounded (Charlotte, NC and Bakersfield, CA).  For all four metro areas, the 
level of black/white segregation declined between 1990 and 2000.  However, the 
places with UGBs experienced an average reduction of 14.83 percent, while the 
places without UGBs experienced an average reduction of only 6.06 percent.  
Nelson suggests, therefore, that urban growth boundaries facilitate black/white 
desegregation. 
 
Methodology 
 
Sample and Data Sources 
 
The statistical analysis for this study is based on 43 matched pairs of cities – 86 
cities, 43 of which have UGBs and 43 of which do not.  To obtain the matched 
pairs I started with Pendall’s (1995) list of 197 jurisdictions with UGBs as 
identified by his 1994 survey.  From Pendall’s list, 43 jurisdictions meet the 
following criteria for inclusion in the sample:  (1) being listed as a city or town by 
the Census Bureau in both 1990 and 2000, (2) having a UGB that was established 
between 1980 and 1990, (3) having its index of dissimilarity listed on the Lewis 
Mumford Center’s segregation index website, and (4) not being located in Oregon 
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or Washington (since both states require all urban areas to establish urban growth 
boundaries and, as a result, there are no nearby comparable jurisdictions without 
UGBs).   
Next, a comparable city or town was identified for each of the 43 places 
with a UGB.  Two factors were initially considered:  location and 1990 total 
population.  Using a United States road atlas (Rand McNally 2004), each city or 
town with a UGB was marked with a map flag.  Then, for each one, the area was 
carefully studied for other places that might serve as the comparable place in my 
analysis.  To the extent possible, places were identified in the same metropolitan 
area, at comparable distance from the metro area’s central city, and with similar 
relation to geographic features that are natural (e.g., rivers and lakes) or manmade 
(e.g., highways).   The 1990 total population size of places was also considered, 
and I noted places of similar size as the places with UGBs.  The place that met 
these location criteria and had the closest population size was selected.  These 
selected places were then checked for three final criteria:  not having a UGB, 
being listed by the Census Bureau as a city or town, and having its segregation 
index listed on the Lewis Mumford Center’s website.  If a selected place did not 
meet all three of these criteria, it was replaced with the next best comparable 
place in terms of all these criteria.  The list of the 43 matched pairs of places 
included in this sample is included as an appendix. 
Selecting a sample comprised of matched pairs of places that are quite 
similar in many respects, but differ with regard to having an UGB, is one way to 
reduce (though not completely eliminate) the influence of other causal variables 
and highlight impact that urban growth boundaries might have.  As noted below, 
in the final step of the analysis I also use multiple regression to distinguish the 
possible effect of UGBs from that of other variables. 
In addition, I purposely selected for comparison two other cities: Portland, 
OR (with an UGB) and Atlanta, GA (no UGB).  Although these two places 
clearly are not “comparable” in way that the other 86 are, many researchers and 
observers have contrasted them because Portland has a reputation as a place that 
keeps development within a tightly constrained area while, in contrast, Atlanta is 
widely known for its extreme degree of suburban sprawl (Cox 1999; Miles, Song 
& Frank 2010; Stanford 2003).  In this analysis I only use the Portland-Atlanta 
contrast heuristically, to suggest what difference an urban growth boundary might 
make based on the experience of these two prominent places.  The actual 
statistical analysis, however, is based only on the other matched pairs of places, 
and sometimes the results from the truly comparable places contradict conclusions 
that might be drawn from a simple Portland-Atlanta comparison.   
 The data for this study were obtained from four sources:  the U.S. Census 
Bureau website (http://www.census.gov), the 1990 Census of Population - Social 
and Economic Characteristics (U.S. Census 1993), the Lewis Mumford Center for 
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Comparative Urban and Regional Research website 
(http://mumford.cas.albany.edu), and Pendall (1995). 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
The three racial/ethnic groups studied here are non-Hispanic blacks (“blacks”), 
non-Hispanic whites (“whites”), and Hispanics.  The three dependent variables 
examined in this study are: (1) amount of in-migration to each place between 
from 1995-2000 for each of the three racial/ethnic groups; (2) percentage change 
in population size between 1990 and 2000 for each of the three racial/ethnic 
groups; and (3) change in the level of residential segregation between 1990 and 
2000, and the level of residential segregation in 2000, as measured by indices of 
dissimilarity between whites and blacks and between whites and Hispanics as 
reported on the Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research 
(State University of New York at Albany) website.  The index of dissimilarity is 
the most widely used indicator of a city’s level of segregation.  The index ranges 
from 0 to 100, and high index values indicate greater residential segregation 
between two groups (i.e., each group’s residents are spatially distributed in very 
different percentages across a city’s census tracts).  The dissimilarity index can 
also be interpreted as the percentage of minority residents that would need to 
move to a different area in order for every neighborhood to replicate the racial 
composition of the city as a whole.  Researchers generally regard a score above 
60 as a high level of residential segregation, indexes between 30 and 60 are 
considered moderate, and dissimilarity indexes below 30 indicate a low level of 
residential segregation (Massey and Denton 1993). 
 
Independent Variables 
 
A variety of independent variables that may relate to a place’s number of 
racial/ethnic minorities and its level of residential segregation are included in the 
study.  The variables are:  (1)  whether or not the place has an urban growth 
boundary;  (2)  the 1990 black population and 1990 Hispanic population as a 
percentage of the total 1990 population of each place; (3) the number of 
households paying 35 percent or more of their income in rent in 2000; (4) the 
number of housing units built in the 1990s as a percentage of all 2000 housing 
units; and (5) regional dummy variables to capture any geographic differences in 
racial housing patterns.  These dummy variables are used to code each place’s 
region according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s scheme.  The reference region is the 
Midwest. 
 In a few cases data on one or more variables was not available.  In those 
cases, the place with missing data and its matched place was not included in the 
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statistical analysis.  For that reason, the number of cases listed in Tables 1-5 does 
not always equal 43 pairs. 
 
Analysis 
 
I analyze the data in five ways.  The first three analyses are designed to discover 
whether UGBs have the effect of restraining or reducing the in-movement and/or 
population increase of blacks or Hispanics.  My first, and most direct, test of this 
involves a statistical analysis that compares places with and without UGBs in 
terms of how much recent (1995 to 2000) in-migration of blacks, Hispanics, and 
whites they have experienced.  If UGBs hinder the arrival of racial minorities, 
then the average in-flow of whites should exceed that of blacks and Hispanics in 
the places with UGBs by significantly more than is the case in the paired places 
without UGBs.  In this test I use a relative measure of in-migration between 1995 
and 2000: number of in-movers of each race as a percentage of each group’s 2000 
population size (i.e., percentage of each race’s total population that has recently 
moved in).  I use a difference of means test to see whether, on average, places 
with UGBs have significantly lower levels of black and Hispanic in-migration 
than do places without UGBs (and show no difference on white in-movement 
level). 
My second analysis also tests whether there is a significant difference 
between places with and without UGBs in the level of each racial/ethnic group’s 
recent in-migration, but in a different way.  The number of black, white, and 
Hispanic in-movers (arriving between 1995 and 2000) to each place are expressed 
as a percentage of each place’s total in-movers. This allows me to see whether or 
not, as a percentage of the total stream of in-movers to an area, blacks and 
Hispanics form a smaller percentage in places with UGBs than in the matched 
places without UGBs (and to see if the same outcome holds for whites).    
Since black, white, and Hispanic in-migration to a place is influenced by 
the size of its pre-existing same-race population, my third analysis takes this into 
account.  Each racial/ethnic group’s population change between 1995 and 2000 is 
expressed as a percentage of the group’s 1990 population.  This population 
change reflects both net migration (i.e., difference between in-migration and out-
migration) and net natural change (i.e., difference between numbers of births and 
deaths).  Here the statistical test shows whether, controlling for the places’ initial 
size of its black, white, and Hispanic populations, there are significant differences 
in the growth of the racial/ethnic groups in the paired cities with and without 
UGBs.   
The remaining two analyses deal with changes in each place’s 1990 and/or 
2000 level of residential racial segregation.  First, I use difference of means tests 
to determine whether black-white and Hispanic-white residential segregation is 
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lower in places with UGBs than in places without them and how level of 
segregation changed between 1990 and 2000.  Finally, multiple regression is used 
to determine if, after controlling for several relevant variables, the presence of an 
UGB has an effect on the 2000 level of racial residential segregation in a place. 
 
Limitations and Clarifications 
 
As with all studies, this research has some limitations.  The first is that the 
meaning and implementation of an “urban growth boundary” is not uniform 
throughout the United States, in fact, urban growth boundaries are defined and 
administered in a variety of ways in different places.  Second, although I tried to 
select cities or towns that were quite similar for each pair of places with and 
without an UGB, in reality, no two cities or towns are a perfect match.  In each 
place, there are unique factors that may affect the attraction it holds for different 
racial groups and their levels of residential segregation.  Third, it is important to 
note that places with urban growth boundaries are small or medium size cities and 
towns that have relatively low percentages of racial minorities.  More specifically, 
in 2000, 93 percent of the places with boundaries had black sub-populations of ten 
percent or less and 59 percent of these places had Hispanic sub-populations of ten 
percent or less.  Also, their levels of racial segregation (as measured by the 
dissimilarity index) are moderate to low (the same holds for the comparable 
places they are paired with in my sample).  This means we must be careful about 
generalizing the conclusions of this research.  My results are most likely to hold 
true for places that are similar to those in this sample; I make no claim that if very 
large, highly segregated major metropolitan areas (e.g., Chicago, Detroit) adopted 
UGBs similar results would be observed.  Finally, it is important to keep in mind 
that, regarding smart growth policies, this research looks at only the urban growth 
boundary.  The UGB is just one smart growth technique among an array of 
techniques.  Some cities and towns that are concerned about sprawl implement 
several smart growth measures, which might include an UGB.  The additional 
effects, if any, of other smart growth practices are not captured by this study.  For 
discussions of how different smart growth policies affect racial housing patterns 
see Pendall et al. (2005) and Nelson et al. (2004).   
 
Results 
 
In-Migration by Blacks and Hispanics 
 
I begin the analyses by showing how patterns in Portland, OR (probably the most 
well known place with an UGB) and Atlanta, GA (well known for its sprawl) 
compare; then I present the findings from the analysis of my matched sample of 
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comparable places with and without UGBs.  If a UGB hinders minorities’ 
movement to a city, we would expect to see lower levels of in-migration by 
blacks and/or Hispanics as compared to whites in places with UGBs. 
 
 Racial groups’ in-migration in relation to its 2000 size.   Comparing 
1995-2000 migration to Portland and to Atlanta, recent Hispanic in-movers to 
Portland represent 38.0% of the 2000 Hispanic population, while in Atlanta they 
represent 53.7%.  Recent black in-movers to Portland represent 16.4% of their 
2000 population, while black in-movers to Atlanta represent 19.0% of the 2000 
black population.  For white in-movers, the pattern is similar: in Portland recent 
migrants constitute 25.1% of its 2000 white population, while in Atlanta, recent 
white in-movers comprise 39.3% of its 2000 white population.  Thus, the place 
with an UGB (Portland) has relatively less recent in-movement of blacks and 
Hispanics than does the place without an UGB (Atlanta), but the same is true for 
whites too.  Is this true for the other cities and towns in my sample? 
 Results shown in Table 1 indicate that, in my sample of matched places, 
the volume of recent in-migration by blacks is not significantly different in places 
with and without UGBs; moreover, the same is true for Hispanic and white in-
movement.  Thus, the pattern seen in the Portland-Atlanta comparison is not 
found in the matched pair sample.  For example, in the sample, recent black in-
movers constituted, on average, 43.16% of the 2000 black population in places 
with UGBs, and 40.05% in places without an UGB (the paired samples t-test 
shows this small difference is not statistically significant).  For Hispanics and 
whites, the differences between places with and without UGBs in terms of mean 
levels of recent in-migration are even smaller and also not statistically significant.  
This step in the analysis implies that new black and Hispanic residents are being 
drawn equally to places with and without urban growth boundaries, so these 
boundaries do not appear to be a barrier to their entry. 
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Table 1.  Difference of Means Tests to Compare Matched Places With and 
Without Urban Growth Boundaries:  Black, Hispanic, and White  
In-Migration (1995-2000) as a Percentage of Each Group’s 2000 Population. 
 
 
 
Group & Place 
Comparison 
# of 
Paired 
Places 
Mean 
% 
of In-
Migrants 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Diff. 
Between 
Means 
Sign. 
Level 
(2-tailed 
test) 
 
Black In-migrants: 
(as % of place’s 2000 
total black population) 
 
to places With UGBs 
 
to places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
43.16 
 
40.05 
 
 
 
 
 
3.34 
 
13.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.308 
      
Hispanic In-migrants: 
(as % of place’s 2000 
total Hispanic 
population) 
 
to places With UGBs 
 
to places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
37 
 
 
 
 
 
40.79 
 
41.73 
 
 
 
 
 
11.52 
 
11.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.610 
      
White In-migrants: 
(as % of place’s 2000 
total white population) 
 
to places With UGBs 
 
to places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
33.34 
 
33.62 
 
 
 
 
7.39 
 
8.01 
 
 
 
 
 
-.48 
 
 
 
 
 
.673 
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Thus, analysis of these data reveals that boundaries do not reduce the 
racial groups’ 1995-2000 in-migration, at least when viewing in-migration as a 
percentage of these groups’ population size in 2000.  On this measure, I find no 
evidence that urban growth boundaries tend to make places less accessible to 
blacks or Hispanics. 
 
 Racial groups’ in-migration in relation to total in-migration.   If UGBs 
somehow hinder or discourage racial minorities from moving to or settling in a 
city or town, then we would expect to find that racial minorities constitute a 
smaller percentage of the total stream of movers into places with UGBs than they 
do in places without UGBs.  I test this expectation in this step of the analysis.  A 
comparison of Atlanta and Portland seems to bear it out for blacks but not 
Hispanics.  In Atlanta, well known for being a very popular destination for black 
movers, blacks comprise 41.0% of all people moving there between 1995 and 
2000.  In contrast, Portland (with an UGB) is not nearly as popular among blacks, 
as only 4.1% of all people moving to Portland in those years were black.  
However, for Hispanics, there is little difference between Atlanta and Portland.  
In Atlanta, 8.5% of all recent in-movers were Hispanic, while 10.0% of Portland’s 
in-movers were Hispanic. 
 Statistical analysis of the matched pairs of places reveals no significant 
difference between places with and without UGBs in terms of the percentages of 
blacks and Hispanics in the streams of people moving to those places (see Table 
2).  For places that have UGBs, blacks, Hispanics, and whites, respectively, 
constituted, on average: 7.70%, 15.91%, and 71.05% of all recent in-movers; in 
places without UGBs the percentages for blacks, Hispanics, and whites are very 
similar: 10.24%, 14.05%, and 70.54, respectively.  The differences between these 
means are not statistically significant at the .05 level.   
So, when considering black and Hispanic in-movers in relation to the total 
number of in-movers between 1995 and 2000, the data reveal no differences that 
might be attributable to the urban growth boundary.  Thus, the presence of UGBs 
does not appear to reduce the ability of blacks and Hispanics to move into cities 
and towns. 
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Table 2.  Difference of Means Tests to Compare Matched Places With and 
Without Urban Growth Boundaries:  Black, Hispanic, and White In-
Migration (1995-2000) as a Percentage of Total In-Migration to Each Place.  
 
 
Group & Place 
Comparison 
# 
of 
Paired 
Places 
Mean 
% 
of all In-
Migrants 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Diff, 
Between 
Means 
Sign. 
Level 
(two-
tailed test) 
 
Black In-migrants: 
(as % of place’s 2000  
total in-migration) 
 
to places With UGBs  
 
to places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
 
     28 
 
     28 
 
 
 
 
 
      7.70 
 
     10.24 
 
 
 
 
 
   12.18 
 
   10.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     -2.53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      .180 
      
Hispanic In-migrants: 
(as % of place’s 2000 
total in-migration) 
 
to places With UGBs  
 
to places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
     37 
      
     37 
 
 
 
 
     15.91 
 
     14.05 
 
 
 
 
   14.74 
 
   10.69 
 
 
 
 
 
     1.85 
 
 
 
 
 
      .402 
      
White In-migrants: 
(as % of place’s 2000 
total in-migration) 
 
to places With UGBs  
 
to places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
     43 
      
     43 
 
 
 
 
     71.05 
 
     70.54 
 
 
 
    
20.28 
    
20.28 
 
 
 
 
 
       .50 
 
 
 
 
 
      .853 
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 Conclusions about in-migration.  The presence or absence of an urban 
growth boundary does not affect the racial/ethnic makeup of recent in-movers.  
This is true whether racial minority in-movers are related to each group’s 2000 
size or to the total number of in-movers.  Although comparing Portland and 
Atlanta may suggest some support for the idea that a place with an UGB will 
attract fewer minority movers, statistical analysis of matched places clearly 
contradicts it and shows no significant differences in minority movement to 
places with and without UGBs.  This implies that differences in minority 
movement to Atlanta versus Portland are most likely due to factors other than the 
presence or absence of an urban growth boundary.   
 
Population Changes of Blacks and Hispanics 
 
Looking at population change offers a broader view of the possible impact of 
urban growth boundaries than does in-migration alone.  In addition to in-
migration, population change captures out-migration, births, and deaths.  Again, if 
an UGB hinders minorities’ population changes, we would expect to see smaller 
black and Hispanic increases in Portland and other places with UGBs than in 
Atlanta and other places without UGBs.   
 
 Each subpopulation’s change in relation to its 1990 size.  Looking at 
Atlanta and Portland, we see somewhat similar population changes in the two 
cities.  Between 1990 and 2000, Atlanta’s black population declined slightly, by 
3.4% (mainly due to blacks moving to Atlanta suburbs), and Portland’s increased 
slightly, by 4.7%.  These two cities experienced more comparable changes in their 
Hispanic populations.  Atlanta’s Hispanic population increased by 148.8% 
between 1990 and 2000, while Portland’s Hispanic population increased by 
159.9%. 
 The analysis of matched pairs yields the finding that UGBs do not impact 
minorities’ population changes (see Table 3).  Since most places in my sample of 
matched pairs had relatively small minority populations in 1990, even small or 
moderate population increases produce large percentage changes for the 1990-
2000 decade.  For blacks, places with an UGB on average saw an increase of 
about 97% in their black population, while places without an UGB experienced a 
black population increase of about 111%; however the paired sample difference 
of means test shows that this difference between places with and without UGBs is 
not statistically significant at the .05 level (p = .470).  Similarly for Hispanics, 
although places with UGBs, on average, grew by about 10 percentage points less 
than places without UGBs (about 125% vs. 136%), the statistical test indicates 
that this is not a significant difference (p = .704).  Thus, the comparison of the 
sample places in matched pairs shows that an UGB does not influence the 
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minorities’ population changes, nor does it affect the size of the white population 
change. 
 
Table 3.  Difference of Means Tests to Compare Matched Places With and 
Without Urban Growth Boundaries:  Black, Hispanic, and White Percentage 
Increase in Population (1990-2000).  
 
 
Group & Place 
Comparison 
# 
of 
Paired 
Places 
Mean 
Pop. 
% 
Increase 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Diff. 
Between 
Means 
Sign. 
Level 
(two-
tailed test) 
 
Black Population % 
Increase (1990 to 2000) 
 
in places With UGBs  
 
in places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
     43 
 
     43 
 
 
 
 
96.66 
 
110.79 
 
 
 
 
123.47 
 
117.51 
 
 
 
 
- 
 
14.14 
 
 
 
 
 
      .470 
      
Hispanic Population % 
Increase (1990 to 2000) 
 
in places With UGBs  
 
in places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
     43 
      
     43 
 
 
 
125.06 
 
135.66 
 
 
 
177.88 
 
151.54 
 
 
 
 
-10.61 
 
 
 
 
      .704 
      
White Population % 
Increase (1990 to 2000) 
 
in places With UGBs  
 
in places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
     43 
      
     43 
 
 
 
19.26 
 
14.50 
 
 
 
41.06 
 
34.86 
 
 
 
 
4.76 
 
 
 
 
      .399 
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Level of Racial Residential Segregation 
 
If UGBs affect level of racial residential segregation, we would expect to see 
differences between places like Portland, with a UGB, and places like Atlanta, 
without a UGB, in their levels of segregation.  Comparing the cities of Atlanta 
and Portland does reveal a notable difference.  Atlanta’s black-white index of 
dissimilarity was very high in 1990 (81.3) and remained very high through 2000 
(81.6).  On the other hand, Portland’s black-white index was considerably lower 
in 1990 (63.6) and declined into the moderate range by 2000 (51.8).  A 
comparison of Hispanic-white changes is also useful.  In Atlanta, Hispanic-white 
residential segregation was moderate in 1990 (47.9) and it increased (57.8) in 
2000.  In Portland’s Hispanic-white residential segregation was low in 1990 
(22.0) and it also increased (to 29.2) in 2000.  Both places experienced an 
increase in the residential segregation of their Hispanic populations, a pattern 
found in many major U.S. urban areas (Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004).  
Nonetheless, for both blacks and Hispanics, residential segregation is lower (in 
both 1990 and 2000) in the city with the UGB (Portland) than in the city without 
one (Atlanta).   We must test to see if this pattern holds up in the matched pairs 
sample.  
 For black-white residential segregation, Figure 1 clearly illustrates the 
mean dissimilarity index values for places with and without UGBs.  In contrast to 
the Portland-Atlanta comparison, in the matched pairs sample, the mean index of 
dissimilarity for these places (regardless of whether or not they have an UGB) is 
in the low range, but black-white segregation in 1990 was significantly higher in 
places with an UGB average (mean dissimilarity index of about 28) than in places 
without one (mean dissimilarity index about 21).   However, as Figure 1 shows, 
by 2000 some convergence occurred in both kinds of places’ mean black-white 
dissimilarity indexes.  In fact, the 2000 difference in average black-white 
segregation between places with and without UGBs (distance on the y-axis) is not 
statistically significant (whereas it was in 1990).  
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Figure 1.   Mean Black-White Index of Dissimilarity for Places With an 
Urban Growth Boundary and Places Without an Urban Growth Boundary, 
1990 and 2000.   
 
 
    * 1990 difference is statistically significant 
  ** 2000 difference is not statistically significant 
 
 Table 4 shows the matched pairs analysis of the changes in the indexes of 
dissimilarity from 1990 to 2000.  These results hint at a slight pro-integrative 
effect of urban growth boundaries for blacks and whites, but this effect is not 
quite large enough to be statistically significant (p = .113).  The data in Table 4 
suggest that places with UGBs on average had a decline in black-white 
dissimilarity index (-1.33), while those without UGBs saw a slight increase 
(1.40).  This implies that places with UGBs experienced more slight declines or 
smaller increases in black-white segregation between 1990 and 2000 than did 
places without boundaries, but this difference is too small to be statistically 
significant.  However, the pattern for Hispanic-white residential segregation is 
Year 
2000** 1990*
30
28
26
24
22
20
With  
UGB 
 Without 
UGB 
 
Index   
 of  
Dissimilarity 
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different.  For places with and without UGBs alike, the mean Hispanic-white 
dissimilarity index rose by just over 5 points between 1990 and 2000.  Thus there 
is no significant difference between how cities with and without UGBs fared in 
terms of Hispanic-white residential segregation. 
 
Table 4. Difference of Means Tests to Compare Change in Level of 
Residential Segregation in Matched Places With and Without Urban Growth 
Boundaries:  Black-White and Hispanic-White Indexes of Dissimilarity, 1990 
to 2000.  
 
 
Group & Place 
Comparison 
# 
of 
Paired 
Places 
Mean 
Change 
in Seg. 
Index 
 
Std. 
Dev. 
Diff. 
Between 
Means 
Sign. 
Level 
(two-
tailed test) 
 
Black-White 
Dissimilarity Index 
Change  (1990 to 2000) 
 
in places With UGBs  
 
in places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
 
     40 
 
     40 
 
 
 
 
 
     -1.33 
 
      1.40 
 
 
 
 
 
     9.05 
 
     7.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       2.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      .113 
      
 
 
Hispanic-White 
Dissimilarity Index 
Change  (1990 to 2000) 
 
in places With UGBs  
 
in places Without 
UGBs 
 
 
 
 
 
     40 
      
     40 
 
 
 
 
 
     5.62 
 
     5.38 
 
 
 
 
 
     7.64 
 
     7.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       0.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      .880 
 
 
Conclusions about changes in level of racial residential segregation. The 
evidence from this step of the analysis provides little or no support for the idea 
that urban growth boundaries contribute to lower (or higher) levels of racial 
residential segregation.  Most places in the sample have low to moderate levels of 
residential segregation, and by 2000 differences in black-white and Hispanic-
17
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white segregation were small enough, between places in the sample with and 
without UGBs, to be statistically insignificant. 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis of Urban Growth Boundaries’ Effect on Level 
of Racial Residential Segregation 
 
In this last step of the analysis I present two multiple regression analyses, one for 
black-white residential segregation and the other for Hispanic-white residential 
segregation.  The dependent variable is the 2000 black-white and Hispanic-white 
indexes of dissimilarity.  The independent variables are included based on each 
variable’s theoretical relevance to the dependent variable.  The independent of 
greatest interest is this study is:  (a) whether or not the place has an urban growth 
boundary.  Other independent variables of interest in the multiple regression 
models are: (b) percentage of the place’s total population that was black or 
Hispanic in 1990 (size of the minority population at the start of the study period); 
(c) percentage of households paying 35% or more of their income in rent in 2000 
(to address the affordability of rental units, which would be more likely to house 
low-income and minority residents than owner-occupied units); (d) number of 
housing units built in the 1990s as a percentage of all 2000 housing units (to 
address the changes in the local housing market, which affect housing availability 
and thus affordability); and (e) regional dummy variables (to capture geographic 
differences in residential segregation, but since no matched pairs of places in my 
sample are located in the Northeast, the dummy variables are for the South and 
West, while the Midwest serves as the regional reference category).  Before 
presenting the multiple regression findings I provide results based on bivariate 
correlations of these variables (see Table 5). 
 The correlation between having a UGB and the black-white index of 
dissimilarity approaches but does not attain statistical significance (r = .181, p = 
.096).  There is even less evidence of an association between the presence or 
absence of an UGB and Hispanic-white residential segregation (r = .069, p = 
.529).  Thus, simple correlation analysis does not support the idea that having an 
urban growth boundary affects a place’s level of residential segregation.   
  The 2000 black-white dissimilarity index has a positive, but weak, 
correlation (r = .345, p = .001) with the percentage of the total population that was 
black in 1990.  Thus, places with larger black populations in 1990 were more 
residentially segregated in 2000 than were places with smaller 1990 black 
populations. 
 Considering Hispanic-white segregation, the percentage of the population 
that was Hispanic in 1990 has a positive, moderate correlation (r = .447, p = .000) 
with the 2000 Hispanic-white index of dissimilarity.  In addition, three more 
independent variables have positive, but weak, correlations with the 2000 
18
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Hispanic-white index.  They are:  percentage of the total population that was 
black in 1990 (r = .219, p = .042), percentage of households that paid 35% or 
more of their income for rent in 2000 (r = .341, p = .001), and the place being 
located in the West, compared to being located in the Midwest (r = .225, p = 
.038).  Thus, places with relatively larger black and Hispanic populations in 1990, 
places with a larger proportion of residents paying high rents, and places located 
in the West generally have higher 2000 Hispanic-white indexes of dissimilarity. 
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Table 5.  Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Dependent and Independent 
Variables used in Multivariate Analysis. 
  
Black/white 
dissimilarity 
index, 2000 
Hispanic/white 
dissimilarity 
index, 2000 
 
Place 
has a 
UGB 
Percent 
black 
pop., 
1990 
Percent 
Hispanic 
pop., 
1990 
%  
paying 
>35% 
for 
rent, 
2000 
1990s 
housing 
units 
as % of 
2000 
housing 
units 
 
Black/white 
dissimilarity 
index, 2000 
       
 
Hispanic/white 
dissimilarity 
index, 2000 
 
.485**       
 
Does place 
have UGB? .181 .069      
 
Percent black 
population, 
1990 
.345** .219* -.117     
 
Percent 
Hispanic 
population, 
1990 
.077 .447** .104 .119    
 
Percent paying 
35% or more 
for rent, 2000 
 
.047 .341** -.088 .151 .462**   
 
Housing units 
built in 1990s 
as % of 2000 
housing units 
-.137 -.115 .070 -.146 -.207 -.267*  
 
Place is in 
West -.150 .225* .023 -.094 .549** .559** -.254* 
 
Place is in 
South .198 .011 -.031 .505** -.141 -.038 .053 
*  p < .05.       **  p < .01.  (Two-tailed test) 
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The correlation matrix also reveals interesting findings about places with 
urban growth boundaries.  Contrary to the claims of some critics of UGBs, the 
presence of these boundaries does not appear to increase the housing affordability 
problem.  In other words, places with UGBs do not have higher percentages of 
households paying more than 35% of their income for rent (r = -.088, p > .05).  In 
addition,  contrary to those who claim that UGBs effectively slow down new 
housing construction, the insignificant correlation between UGBs and percentage 
of 2000 housing units that were built in the 1990s (r = .070, p > .05) indicates that 
places with and without UGBs do not differ in new housing construction.  On the 
other hand, there is a statistically significant weak negative correlation (r = -.267, 
p = .013) between the “new housing” and “high rent” variables.  This suggests 
that the addition of new housing helps to reduce the cost of rental units. 
 
 Factors affecting black-white segregation.  Table 6, model 1 presents the 
multiple regression results used to identify and evaluate variables related to black-
white segregation (based on all 86 places in the sample).  The adjusted R2 
indicates that the independent variables in the model explain 15.2% of the linear 
variation in the 2000 black-white index of dissimilarity.  Thus a great deal of the 
variation in places’ levels of black-white segregation is unexplained by the 
variables in this model.  Of greater substantive interest, this analysis shows that 
the presence of an UGB is a statistically significant predictor of the 2000 black-
white index of dissimilarity (b = 6.381, Beta = .244, p = .018), controlling for the 
other variables in the model.  Given the statistically insignificant relationship 
between UGBs and 2000 black-white segregation found in the previous steps of 
the analysis, this finding is quite interesting.  It means that that controlling for 
other variables in the model, having an UGB is associated with having higher 
2000 black-white dissimilarity index.  In other words, when other factors are 
equal, places with an urban growth boundary tend to have higher indexes of 
dissimilarity (on average by 6.381 points), thus more black-white segregation, 
than places that lack an urban growth boundary. 
 The effects of two other variables are also noteworthy.  The strongest 
predictor of the 2000 black-white dissimilarity index is percentage black in 
places’ 1990 population (b = .578, Beta =.343, p = .005).  Again, the effect is 
positive, that is, the places with a higher percentage of blacks in 1990 have a 
higher segregation.   Also, a marginally significant variable, being located in the 
West, has a negative effect on the 2000 black-white index (b = -6.518, Beta = -
.249, p = .078).  On average and net of other variables in the model, places in the 
West have indexes of dissimilarity that are 6.518 points lower than places in the 
Midwest.  Both of these results are consistent with previous research on black-
white residential segregation.   
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 The multiple regression analysis indicates that urban growth boundaries 
have an impact on black-white residential segregation.  Specifically, it shows that 
a place’s having a UGB is related to a somewhat higher 2000 black-white index 
of dissimilarity (i.e., greater segregation) rather than a lower index.  
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Table 6.   Multiple Regression (OLS) Analysis of Black-White and Hispanic-
White Residential Segregation (Index of Dissimilarity), 2000. 
 
Variables 
Model 1: 
Black-White 
Segregation, 2000 
Model 2: 
Hispanic-White 
Segregation, 2000 
 
B 
(standard error) 
Beta 
B 
(standard error) 
Beta 
Urban Growth 
Boundary 
6.381* 
(2.647) 
.244 
1.326 
(2.655) 
.050 
Percent Black in 1990 
.578** 
(.202) 
.343 
 
---- 
Percent Hispanic in 
1990 ---- 
.495*** 
(.150) 
.404 
Percent paying 35% or 
more for rent 
in 2000 
.31 
(.334) 
.118 
.580† 
(.339) 
.218 
Housing units built in 
1990s as % of 2000 
units 
-.12 
(.096) 
-.132 
-.01 
(.094) 
-.006 
Region: 
West a 
-6.518† 
(3.645) 
-.249 
-2.86 
(3.901) 
-.108 
Region: 
South a 
-2.06 
(4.486) 
-.060 
1.17 
3.919 
.034 
Constant 16.193
† 
(9.538) 
1.522 
(9.623) 
Adjusted R2 .152 .177 
Number of Cases 86 86 
               
 Notes:   †  p < .10     *p < .05   ** p < .01   *** p < .001 
 In each cell the top number is the unstandardized regression coefficient, middle  
     number is the standard error, and bottom number is the standardized         
     regression coefficient. 
                    a
 Midwest is reference category for regions   
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 Factors affecting Hispanic-white segregation.  Table 6, model 2 provides 
the multiple regression results for Hispanic-white residential segregation.  The 
adjusted R2  (17.7%) for the Hispanic-white regression is very close to that of the 
black-white regression, indicating that much variation remains after considering 
the variables in this model.  Upon closer inspection, however, the Hispanic-white 
regression results yield one valuable finding that differs from those of the black-
white regression.  Most importantly, the presence of an UGB is not a statistically 
significant factor affecting the 2000 Hispanic-white index of dissimilarity.  Thus, 
there is not a relationship between whether or not a place has an urban growth 
boundary and its level of Hispanic-white segregation in 2000.   
 Only two independent variables are found to be statistically significant in 
influencing the 2000 Hispanic-white index of dissimilarity.  The first is the 
percentage Hispanic in the 1990 population (b = .495, Beta = .404, p = .001).  
This is the strongest predictor of 2000 Hispanic-white segregation.  The effect is 
positive, that is, places with larger Hispanic populations in 1990 had higher 
Hispanic-white segregation in 2000.  A second marginally significant variable is 
the percentage of households paying 35% or more of their income in rent in 2000 
(b = .580, Beta =.218, p = .092).  This effect also is positive. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
My findings support the position that urban growth boundaries do not affect either 
the racial makeup of cities’ and towns’ in-movers or their population changes.  
First, the presence or absence of an urban growth boundary did not affect the 
racial/ethnic makeup of the in-movers to the cities and towns in the sample.  This 
is the case whether the number of black or Hispanic in-movers is analyzed in 
relation to each group’s 2000 size or in relation to the total number of in-movers.  
Second, the presence or absence of a UGB around each of the places in the 
sample did not influence blacks’ or Hispanics’ percentage change in population 
between 1990 and 2000.  Thus these findings contradict the idea that urban 
growth boundaries hinder the in-movement and/or population growth of racial 
minorities. 
 The results of this analysis, however, are more ambiguous regarding the 
relationship between UGBs and racial residential segregation.  On the one hand, 
two findings support Pozdena’s (2002) claim that UGBs increase racial residential 
segregation.  First, in 1990 the black-white index of dissimilarity was 
significantly higher in places with UGBs than in places without them (see Figure 
1).  Second, the black-white multiple regression analysis reveals that, with other 
variables controlled, having a UGB is associated with a place having a higher 
2000 black-white dissimilarity index, on average, by about six points (Table 6 
model 1).  On the other hand, none of the statistical analyses used here (i.e., 
24
The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jpps/vol5/iss1/2
25 
 
difference of means tests, correlations, multiple regression) found any significant 
relationship between UGBs and Hispanic-white residential segregation.  Also, the 
multiple regression model that shows a positive significant UGB “effect” on 
black-white residential segregation leaves a lot of unexplained variation, which 
implies that it does not tell the “whole story.”  Further research would be useful to 
discover whether or not UGB’s positive relationship with black-white residential 
segregation still holds when other good explanatory variables are added to the 
model.  Moreover, we should keep in mind that the 2000 black-white dissimilarity 
indexes studied here are in the low or moderate range, both for places with and 
without UGBs, far below levels found in the larger U.S. cities and metropolitan 
areas.  Research on blacks’ preferences about desired racial composition of their 
neighborhoods indicates that they like residential areas with a substantial black 
presence (Charles 2000, 2001; Clayton et al. 2000).  Given that most places in my 
sample have relatively low percentages of black residents, my regression results 
are actually not inconsistent with the claim that places with UGBs are where 
black residents are a little closer to achieving their preferred neighborhood racial 
composition.     
 In positioning my research in the ongoing debate about the impact of 
urban growth boundaries, I occupy the middle ground.  That is, based on the 
evidence uncovered here, I do not concur with Pozdena’s (2002) conclusion that 
“Portland style” growth containment policies exclude racial/ethnic minorities, nor 
do I see UGBs as a strong cause of racial segregation.  But, neither do my 
findings support Nelson’s (2004) contention that this growth control device 
promotes racial integration.  My research also shows that conclusions based on 
comparisons of Portland and Atlanta often are misleading and should not go 
unchallenged.  
This study also reveals some interesting insights into factors affecting 
black-white versus Hispanic-white segregation.  First, it is important to note that 
the black-white and Hispanic-white multiple regression analyses share a common 
finding, namely that in both cases their respective 1990 group population size is 
positively linked to their 2000 index of dissimilarity scores.  On further 
examination, however, the two multiple regressions reveal that different variables 
are associated with the 2000 level of black-white segregation than with the 
Hispanic-white segregation.  For black-white segregation, the presence of an 
UGB has a significant positive correlation with 2000 black-white segregation, 
while being located in the West (as opposed to the Midwest) has a significant 
negative relationship.  For Hispanic-white segregation, the percentage of 
households paying 35% or more of their income for rent in 2000 was significantly 
correlated with 2000 Hispanic-white segregation level. 
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Sociological and Policy Implications 
 
Since this study yields mixed findings about the relationship between urban 
growth boundaries and their effects on racial/ethnic minorities, neither a strong 
“pro” nor “con” position can be taken regarding UGBs.  The preponderance of 
evidence suggests that they are not harmful, but sociologists and urban planners 
should not be insensitive to or complacent about the possible effects of urban 
growth boundaries.  Based on this study’s results and the fact that boundaries 
have been used widely since only 1980, there is a need for continued interest in 
the possible racial impact of boundaries and how UGBs may interact with other 
urban or suburban land use, transportation, and development policies (which 
might or might not be consistent with smart growth principles).  In the future, this 
analysis or a similar study should be conducted using 2010 Census data.  As 
urban growth boundaries remain in force over many decades, their impact on the 
U.S.’s ever evolving cities and towns merits continued study.  
 It is also critical that planners and elected officials remain alert to and 
consider the possible effects of their land use decisions on the racial/ethnic 
makeup of residents.  Just as an environmental impact study is a required part of 
many proposals, the possible sociological impacts should also be addressed.  As 
Bobo suggests, “Always pose an explicit race question” (2000:307). 
 Gentrification continues to be a concern in relation to smart growth 
practices.  As mentioned earlier, gentrification by whites and the displacement of 
blacks are occurring in both Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, two cities 
with urban growth boundaries (Harden 2006).  These changes might be due, at 
least in part, to the cities’ urban growth boundaries.  Since the Pacific Northwest 
is the national leader in implementing smart growth measures, it is also at the 
forefront of revealing the effects of these techniques.  Sociologists and urban 
planners should consider the recent dynamics in Portland and Seattle and check 
for possible unintended effects of smart growth.  
Efforts can be made to ensure that minorities are considered by, and 
involved in, smart growth initiatives.  Equity planners place a high priority on the 
needs of society’s disadvantaged groups and seek to design cities that benefit all 
residents.  Bobo (2000) suggests the following as measures planners should take 
to achieve this goal:  incorporating the disadvantaged into the planning process, 
considering a proposal’s possible effects on disadvantaged groups, advocating for 
low-income housing, and monitoring for possible housing discrimination and 
violations of anti-discrimination laws. 
 Planners can take additional measures to foster stable, racially integrated 
neighborhoods.  These are suggested by the work of Ellen (2000) who identified 
factors that contribute to such neighborhoods.  A range of housing options, 
including a substantial number of rental units, is correlated with integrated 
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neighborhoods.  Renting an apartment or house is more affordable than 
homeownership, making the area more accessible to minorities.  Also, since social 
networks are important to maintaining stability, creating venues such as recreation 
centers, parks, and meeting facilities is vital.  Likewise, ensuring that a 
neighborhood has amenities such as stores and services, good schools, and a low 
crime rate makes an area desirable to all--whites and minorities, owners and 
renters, and current and potential residents. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Is smart growth fair growth?  This research, with regard to urban growth 
boundaries, shows that the answer is, for the most part, yes.  This response is 
based on a definition of “fair” as an outcome in which urban growth boundaries 
do not hinder the in-movement, population growth, or residential integration of 
blacks or Hispanics. 
 As smart growth practices, and specifically urban growth boundaries, gain 
momentum, their possible effect on who lives in areas with boundaries becomes 
an increasingly vital concern.  Further, as racial and ethnic minorities continue to 
make up a greater and greater proportion of U.S. residents, smart growth's impact 
on racial housing patterns is an important consideration for land use planners, 
sociologists, and society as a whole. 
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Appendix:  List of pairs of places in sample 
 
 
State 
Place with urban growth 
boundary 
Place without urban growth  
boundary 
AZ Chandler Peoria 
AZ Mesa Tempe                 
CA Camarillo Mission Viejo 
CA Cathedral City Banning 
CA Dublin Pleasanton 
CA El Cajon La Mesa 
CA Grand Terrace Loma Linda 
CA Martinez Pittsburg 
CA Milpitas Newark 
CA Oxnard Oceanside 
CA Pinole Hercules 
CA Pleasant Hill Walnut Creek 
CA Poway Santee 
CA San Diego Dallas, TX 
CA San Rafael San Pablo 
CA San Ramon Danville 
CA Santa Paula Santa Clarita 
CA Thousand Oaks Simi Valley 
CO Golden Broomfield 
CO Louisville Lafayette 
FL Clearwater Largo 
FL Pinellas Park Bradenton 
FL Safety Harbor Oldsmar 
GA Peachtree City Newnan 
IL McHenry Woodstock 
IL W. Chicago Lockport 
MD Westminster Aberdeen 
MN Chaska  Chanhassen 
MN Eden Prairie Minnetonka 
MN Plymouth Brooklyn Park 
MN Prior Lake Savage 
MN Ramsey Elk River 
MN Stillwater White Bear Lake 
MN Woodbury Oakdale 
MO O’Fallon Bridgeton 
MO St. Peters St. Charles 
TX Lancaster Cedar Hill 
TX McKinney Allen 
WI Franklin Greenfield 
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State 
Place with urban growth 
boundary 
Place without urban growth  
boundary 
WI Kenosha Racine 
WI Muskego Glendale 
WI New Berlin Brookfield 
WI West Bend Watertown 
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